Nuclear supply chain under pressure in a fragmented world

The nuclear sector is entering a new phase of global expansion. Across the globe, governments are commissioning new large-scale reactors, accelerating SMR development, and investing in advanced fuel cycles. Ambitions are bold: the EU has reaffirmed its support for next-generation nuclear projects as part of its decarbonization strategy, while the United States, China, and the UK have each committed to fleets of reactors by mid-century. 

As an example of commitment, the US Government and Westinghouse have committed to build AP1000 and AP300 reactors for at least $80 billion. This one-in-a-lifetime partnership will allow the US Government to receive 20% of any cash distributions to the portion above $17.5 billion. But more interestingly, when looking at the details of this agreement, if before 2029, the valuation of Westinghouse is above $30 billion, the US Government can force an IPO and has 5 years to buy up to 20% of the shares at a discounted price. This shows confirmation of a strong renaissance for nuclear, with governments such as in the US particularly bullish.

This surge of demand, however, exposes a growing vulnerability. Nuclear energy depends on complex, highly specialized, and globally interdependent supply chains. In an era defined by geopolitical fragmentation, resource nationalism, and industrial bottlenecks, these supply chains are increasingly under strain. For executives, policymakers, and investors, resilience is no longer a secondary consideration: it is a strategic determinant of whether nuclear’s renaissance can be delivered on time and at scale.

The strategic bottlenecks

Unlike other energy technologies, nuclear relies on a small number of qualified suppliers, with strict standards and long lead times. The most critical bottlenecks include:

• Heavy manufacturing capacity: Large forgings for reactor pressure vessels, steam generators, and pressurizers are manufactured by only a handful of facilities worldwide, many concentrated in East Asia. Lead times can stretch years, and disruptions can cascade across multiple projects. Those equipment are known as long-lead items.
  
• Nuclear-grade materials and components: Pumps, valves, instrumentation, and control systems must meet stringent nuclear qualification standards. Supplier pools are narrow, and substituting components is often impossible without redesign and relicensing.
  
• Fuel cycle dependencies: Europe has long depended on imported uranium and enrichment, with Russia historically supplying about 20% of global enrichment capacity. Alternatives exist in the UK, in the Netherlands, Germany, France, China, and the U.S., but diversifying requires years of investment and coordination.
  
• Workforce and specialist services: Nuclear construction depends on highly skilled welders, inspectors, and project managers, many of whom are approaching retirement. Shortages of qualified personnel are emerging as a bottleneck as critical as physical components.

Geopolitics and fragmentation

Geopolitical dynamics are intensifying supply chain risks. The conflict in Ukraine has triggered an urgent reassessment of fuel dependencies, particularly in Europe. The EU is now moving to phase out reliance on Russian enrichment and conversion services, but building alternative capacity will take years and billions in investment. Alternatives to ROSATOM such as Westinghouse and FRAMATOME are also now offering VVER-compatible fuel to diversify fuel manufacturing options.

Elsewhere, resource nationalism is reshaping uranium markets. Kazakhstan, the world’s largest uranium producer, has signaled its intention to prioritize domestic processing and partnerships with aligned states. The U.S. has introduced incentives to rebuild domestic enrichment capacity and recently awarded six companies with energy contracts, while China is securing long-term supply contracts across Africa and Central Asia. In this fragmented context, uranium and enrichment are no longer commodities traded over the counter but strategic assets embedded in geopolitical competition.

Fragmentation also undermines international collaboration. While organizations such as the IAEA and OECD-NEA promote cooperative approaches, national industrial strategies increasingly emphasize domestic capacity and “friend-shoring.” This reduces economies of scale and creates duplication of effort, raising costs for all players.

The economic consequences of weak supply chains

The economic impact of supply chain weakness is profound. Delays in component delivery or shortages of qualified vendors are among the most common causes of cost overruns in nuclear projects. A single missed delivery of a reactor pressure vessel can delay an entire project by years. For large-scale reactors, such setbacks translate into billions in additional costs. Let alone quality risks such as seen with the vessel of the EPR Flamanville.

For SMRs, which promise faster deployment through modularity, the supply chain is even more critical. Their business model depends on repeatability and standardization, akin to shipbuilding or aerospace. Without industrial capacity to mass-produce modules at scale, SMRs risk becoming boutique projects, losing the very economic advantage that makes them attractive. As the OECD-NEA has highlighted, the path from FOAK to NOAK depends entirely on robust supply chains able to deliver at scale and cost.

The financial sector is increasingly aware of these risks. Investors demand evidence of credible supply chain strategies before committing to multi-billion-dollar projects. For utilities and developers, this means that supply chain resilience is no longer just an operational issue—it is central to financial bankability.

Central and Eastern Europe: a strategic opportunity

While supply chain vulnerability is a challenge, it also creates opportunities for new players. Central and Eastern Europe, where many new nuclear projects are planned, is well-positioned to capture industrial value. The region has a strong base in heavy industry, engineering, and skilled labor, making it a natural candidate to host parts of the nuclear supply chain.

Poland has launched initiatives to attract large scale and SMR developers and is exploring partnerships with Western vendors. The Czech Republic is leveraging its historical expertise in reactor design and manufacturing to secure a role in both large reactor and SMR supply chains. Romania, with its plans for CANDU refurbishment and SMR deployment, is positioning itself as a hub for both construction services and long-term fuel cycle activities.

By integrating nuclear into broader industrial policy, CEE countries could transform nuclear projects from technology imports into engines of domestic industrial renewal. The choice is not only about energy, it is about whether nuclear becomes a strategic lever for reindustrialization, exports, and long-term competitiveness.

Building resilience through strategy

Strengthening nuclear supply chains requires coordinated action at multiple levels. Diversification of suppliers is essential, reducing dependence on single points of failure. Workforce strategies must address demographic challenges, with new pipelines of engineers, welders, and project managers built through apprenticeships and university partnerships.

Standardization of designs is another key factor. The proliferation of bespoke reactor designs fragments demand and weakens supply chains. Consolidating around standardized models enables economies of scale, reduces qualification costs, and creates predictable demand for suppliers. This is particularly important for SMRs, where standardization is central to their economic rationale.

Finally, governments and private firms must collaborate to build industrial resilience. Public funding can support new manufacturing capacity, while export credit agencies and international financing institutions can de-risk investment in supply chains. For private developers, embedding supply chain strategy into project planning is no longer optional—it is a prerequisite for success. Lessons from aerospace and semiconductors are clear: industrial ecosystems do not emerge spontaneously; they are cultivated through sustained investment, policy alignment, and long-term partnerships.

The nuclear renaissance will be defined not only by technological breakthroughs or political commitments but by the resilience of the supply chains that make them possible. In a fragmented world, nuclear components, fuel cycles, and skilled labor are not just industrial inputs—they are strategic assets.

The companies and countries that recognize this early, investing in diversification, industrial capacity, and workforce renewal, will secure a competitive advantage. They will deliver projects on time, attract investor confidence, and position themselves as leaders in a sector central to energy security and decarbonization. Those who ignore the supply chain challenge may find that their nuclear ambitions are constrained not by technology, but by the weakest link in a fragile global system.